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In Jean v. Massachusetts State Police, police officers conducted a warrantless
search of Paul Pechonis's home.' Unbeknownst to them, the search was
audiotaped and videotaped by a "nanny-cam." Pechonis later gave the
recording to Mary Jean, who posted it on her Web site with commentary
criticizing the local District Attorney. The officers claimed that Jean had
violated state law by willfully disclosing the contents of a recording made
without their prior consent.' They ordered Jean to remove the recording.3 The
district court granted Jean's request for preliminary injunctive relief and the
First Circuit affirmed, concluding that the First Amendment likely protected
Jean's disclosure of the recording.4 However, the First Circuit implied that
Pechonis had violated the Massachusetts recording law.'
Massachusetts and at least twelve other states criminalize recording a
communication without the knowledge or consent of all parties to the
communication.' While some of these states' laws could be construed to
1. 492 F.3 d 24, 25 (ist Cir. 2007).
2. Id. at 25-26 & n.2; see also MAss. GEN. LAws ch. 272, § 99(C)(1), (3) (2000).
3. Jean, 492 F.3d at 25-26.
4. Id. at 33.
5. Id. at 31 (stating that the tape was "recorded illegally" and "illegally intercepted").
6. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 632 (West 1999); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 1335(a) (2007); FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 9 34 .o3 (2)(d) (West 2001); HAw. REv. STAT. ANN. § 711-1111(1)(d)-(e) (Lexis
Nexis 2007); 720 ILL. CoMP. STAT. ANN. 5/14-2(a)(1) (West 2003); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-
4001(a) (Supp. 2006); MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 10-402(c)(3) (West 2oo6);
MICH. COMp. LAws. ANN. § 750.539c-d (West 2004); MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-8-213(1)(c)
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exempt some recording of police,7 others offer no textual basis for such an
exemption.8 Citizens in several states have been arrested,9 and in some cases
convicted,'0 for taping police conduct.
This Comment argues that citizen tape recording provides a necessary
check against police abuses of power and furthers privacy values underlying the
Constitution and other laws. But police officers' interests in privacy and safety
must be balanced as well. Therefore, states should permit citizens to record
police officers in the line of duty without those officers' consent, as long as
their recordings are made in a physically unintrusive manner and do not
capture police communications that police could reasonably expect not to be
recorded.
I. THE STATUS OF STATE RECORDING LAWS
Massachusetts and a number of other states prevent citizens from recording
police officers' conversations, even within citizens' own homes. Massachusetts
itself broadly prohibits the willful "secret[] record[ing]" of "any wire or oral
communication" by any citizen without the consent of all parties to the
communication." Accordingly, Massachusetts's highest court has refused to
exempt citizens who record police officers, even when the recording captures
alleged police misconduct. 2
As the First Circuit recognized, the First Amendment protects individuals
like Jean who distribute recordings of illegal police conduct. But it probably
does not protect individuals like Pechonis who produce the recordings. In
(2007); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 57o-A:2(I) (2003); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5704(4)
(West 2000); WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 9.73.030(1) (West 2003).
7. See, e.g., WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 9.73.030(1) (West 2003) (protecting only "private" oral
communication); State v. Flora, 845 P.2d 1355 (Wash. Ct. App. 1992) (holding that police
officers' conversations during arrests are not "private").
8. See, e.g., 720 ILL. COMp. STAT. ANN. 5/14-2(1) (West 2003); MASS. GEN. LAwS ch. 272,
§ 99(C) (2000); MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-8-213(1)(c) (2007). But see 720 ILL. COMP. STAT.
ANN. S/14 -3 0) (West 2003) (exempting recordings made with reasonable suspicion that
another party to the conversation will commit a criminal offense).
9. See, e.g., People v. Beardsley, 503 N.E.2d 346 (Ill. 1986); Flora, 845 P.2d 1355; Matt Miller,
He's Cleared in Police Taping, PATRIOT-NEWS (Harrisburg), June 21, 2007, at Al; Sarasotan
Charged with Taping Police, SARASOTA HERALD-TRiB. (Fla.), Sept. 1, 2000, at 4B; Andrew
Wolfe, Man Charged After Videotaping Police, NASHUA TELEGRAPH (N.H.), June 29, 2006, at
1.
io. See, e.g., State v. Bichsel, 790 P.2d 1142 (Or. Ct. App. 199o).
11. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 272, § 99(B)(4), (C)(1) (2000) (emphasis added).
12. Commonwealth v. Hyde, 750 N.E.2d 963, 964 (Mass. 2001).
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Bartnicki v. Vopper, the Supreme Court suggested that disclosure is protected
when it constitutes "the publication of truthful information of public
concern."'" The Court explicitly declined, however, to protect "obtaining the
relevant information unlawfully."'4 Furthermore, "[t]he First Amendment
[does not become] a license ... to intrude by electronic means ... simply
because the person subjected to the intrusion is reasonably suspected of
committing a crime."'" Thus, the Amendment does not excuse citizens from
state liability for recording police, even where citizens allege police misconduct.
II. THE IMPORTANCE OF CITIZEN TAPE RECORDING OF POLICE
A. The Need for Strong Checks Against Police Abuses
As compared to other government officials, law enforcement officers pose
the greatest risk to citizens' physical integrity and privacy because they are
authorized to implement the state's most physically coercive and invasive
powers. Moreover, law enforcement abuses have the potential to be much
worse than the harms inflicted by private citizens. First, the government's
coercive and invasive powers exceed those of private citizens 6 Police officers
are permitted to commit actions that would be illegal if committed by private
citizens," and some officers abuse that permission." Second, police abuses are
symbolically worse because they are taken on behalf of all citizens.19
13. 532 U.S. 514, 534 (2001).
14. Id. at 532 n.19. This holding is consistent with the many cases establishing that the First
Amendment does not protect the media from liability for privacy-invasive torts or crimes
committed in the process of newsgathering. See, e.g., Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 684
(1972); Galella v. Onassis, 487 F.2d 986, 995-96 (2d Cir. 1973); Dietemann v. Time, Inc.,
449 F.2d 245, 249 (9 th Cir. 1971).
1. Dietemann, 449 F.2d at 249.
16. See Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 392 (1971) ("An agent acting-
albeit unconstitutionally-in the name of the United States possesses a far greater capacity
for harm than an individual trespasser....").
17. See Malcolm Thorburn, Justifications, Powers, and Authority, 117 YALE L.J. 1070, 1104 (2008)
("[A) list of police functions looks like a list of serious criminal offenses.").
is. See, e.g., DAVID WEISBURD ET AL., NAT'L INST. OF JUSTICE, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, POLICE
ATTITUDES TOwARD ABUSE OF AUTHORITY: FINDINGS FROM A NATIONAL STUDY 3 (2000),
http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/181312.pdf (reporting that twenty-two percent of police
officers claim their fellow officers sometimes, often, or always use excessive force).
ig. See Joseph A. Colquitt, Rethinking Entrapment, 41 AM. CGRiM. L. REV. 1389, 1437 (2004)
(referring to "the power of police to act on [the public's] behalf').
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The Massachusetts statute facilitated the invasion of Pechonis's personal
privacy in his home by overprotecting police officers' privacy while in the line
of duty. This outcome is inconsistent with most sources of privacy values in
our legal culture, which emphasize individual privacy, particularly in the
home.2" The Fourth Amendment focuses on "[t]he right of the people to be
secure in their persons, [and] houses" from infringement by government
officials. 1 Similarly, the Massachusetts recording law purports to protect the
privacy of "citizens of the commonwealth,"2 rather than the privacy of police
officers. Meanwhile, federal and state laws and cases demonstrate that law
enforcement officers must tolerate a greater degree of intrusion than private
citizens."
B. Existing Checks Are Insufficient
Many internal checks on law enforcement officers already reduce those
officers' privacy in order to prevent abuses. For example, federal and state
governments monitor officers through drug testing and e-mail and phone
monitoring.' 4 But most forms of monitoring do not cover officers away from
the police station, where many searches and arrests occur and police officers
often fail to report them.2S Police corruption can undermine internal
monitoring and sanctions even where they do apply.26
20. See, e.g., 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIPES *288.
21. U.S. CONST. amend. IV (emphasis added); see Segura v. United States, 468 U.S. 796, 8io
(1984); Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 589-90 (198o).
22. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 272, § 99(A) (2000) (emphasis added).
23. See, e.g., Employee Polygraph Protection Act of 1988, 29 U.S.C. § 20o6 (2000) (protecting
most private employees from employer-required lie detector tests, but excluding
government employees, private security officers, and other private employees with
responsibilities that resemble those of police officers); Biehunik v. Felicetta, 441 F.2d 228,
231 (2d Cir. 1971). Massachusetts itself has recognized that police officers are entitled to less
privacy than ordinary citizens. See Guiney v. Police Comm'r, 582 N.E.2d 523, 528 (Mass.
1991) (listing specific Massachusetts statutes as well as First Circuit and Massachusetts
Supreme Judicial Court cases).
24. See Amati v. City of Woodstock, 176 F. 3d 952, 955 (7th Cir. 1999); John B. Wefing, Employer
Drug Testing: Disparate Judicial and Legislative Responses, 63 ALB. L. REV. 799, 8o5-14 (2000).
25. See WEISBURD, supra note 18, at 3 (documenting that sixty-one percent of police officers
claim fellow officers do not always report even serious criminal forms of police abuse).
26. Gabriel J. Chin & Scott C. Wells, The "Blue Wall of Silence" as Evidence of Bias and Motive To
Lie: A New Approach to Police Perjury, 59 U. PITT. L. REv. 233, 237 (1998); William C.
Heffernan, Foreword: The Fourth Amendment Exclusionary Rule as a Constitutional Remedy, 88
GEO. L.J. 799,868-69 (2000).
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For these reasons, police departments should not simply require officers to
videotape their own interactions with citizens. Officers can turn off their
recorders 7 or record over the footage." Furthermore, police departments could
deny the existence of inculpatory recordings or attempt to shield them from
discovery by claiming they contain confidential information."
In contrast, citizen recording provides an external check not subject to
intradepartment corruption. Where citizens are permitted to surreptitiously
record the police, officers have incentives to be on their best behavior at all
times, not just when their own recorders are on. Permitting citizen recording
also allows citizens to control whether and when to record their interactions
with the police. This respects citizens' privacy more than if police officers were
required to record all citizens' interactions with them regardless of the citizens'
consent.30
The exclusionary rule is one existing external check against police abuses,
but it is insufficient. The rule does not deter police searches when the goal is
not principally to secure an individual conviction -for example, when officers
seek only to confiscate contraband, disrupt illicit networks, or assert authority
on the streets. 31 Furthermore, the exclusionary rule pressures judges to find
that a search or seizure was "reasonable" under the Fourth Amendment3" and
police officers to misrepresent how they obtained evidence33 in order to avoid
27. Christopher Slobogin, Testilying: Police Perjury and What To Do About It, 67 U. COLO. L.
REV. 1037, 1052 (1996).
28. Cf Christina Hall, Suspension Advised for Officer Who Erased Tape, BLADE (Toledo), July 12,
2007, at Bi (describing how a police officer purposely recorded over a videotape of an
arrest).
29. See Kathleen M. O'Day, Comment, Pretextual Traffic Stops: Protecting Our Streets or Racist
Police Tactics?, 23 U. DAYTON L. REV. 313, 328 (1998).
3o. See Slobogin, supra note 27, at 1O52.
31. See Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 410 (1971) (Harlan, J.,
concurring); Wesley G. Skogan & Tracey L. Meares, Lawful Policing, 593 ANNALS AM. AcAD.
POL. & SOC. Sci. 66, 71 (2004).
32. Akhil Reed Amar, Fourth Amendment First Principles, 107 HARv. L. REV. 757, 799 (1994);
Guido Calabresi, The Exclusionary Rule, 26 HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 111, 112 (2002).
33. See Tom Barker & David Carter, "Fluffing Up the Evidence and Covering Your Ass": Some
Conceptual Notes on Police Lying, 11 DEVIANT BEHAVIOR 61, 67 (1990) (suggesting that many
police officers endorse an "ends justifies the means" approach and therefore feel morally
justified in misleading the court in order to secure a conviction); David N. Dorfman, Proving
the Lie: Litigating Police Credibility, 26 A. J. CRIm. L. 455, 461 (1999); Myron W. Orfield,
Jr., Deterrence, Perjury and the Heater Factor: An Exclusionary Rule in the Chicago Criminal
Courts, 63 U. COLO. L. REV. 75, 107 (1992) (providing evidence that police perjury occurs in
twenty to fifty-three percent of the city's suppression hearings); Slobogin, supra note 27, at
1040.
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letting guilty defendants go free. In contrast, citizen recording gives officers
reason to admit their illegal practices to their supervisors immediately, in order
to address the problem through training and other remedial methods before a
citizen brings suit using a recording as evidence.
Civil suits pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 provide another insufficient
external check.14 Such suits are prohibitively expensive for the poor, who are
frequent targets of police abuse.3 s Moreover, many who can afford to sue are
insufficiently compensated for doing so: the harms of privacy violations are
difficult to measure and therefore frequently result in only nominal damages;
hence plaintiffs do not sue often enough to deter privacy violations? 6 When
plaintiffs do bring § 1983 actions, they face significant evidentiary hurdles.
Civil juries tend to trust police officers' testimony over suspected criminals'
testimony.37 Where courts permit citizen recordings to be introduced as
evidence, the recordings powerfully rebut jury bias favoring police credibility. 8
Thus, citizen recording fills in gaps in existing checks against law
enforcement abuses. But beyond that, citizen recording provides a powerful
publicity check. Recording devices can capture police officers' misconduct in
order to publicize it. When the media publicizes citizens' recordings, it enables
the general public to use the political process to pressure law enforcement
officers to respect the limits of their authority.39 Officers may generally avoid
performing illegal activities, mindful of the risk of being recorded and the
attendant public scorn. Finally, citizen recording ensures the "transparent
34- See Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 61o-l1 (2006) (Breyer, J., dissenting); NAT'L
RESEARCH COUNCIL OF THE NAT'L ACADS., FAIRNESS AND EFFECTIVENESS IN POLICING: THE
EVIDENCE 276 (Wesley Skogan & Kathleen Frydl eds., 2004); Potter Stewart, The Road to
Mapp v. Ohio and Beyond: The Origins, Development and Future of the Exclusionary Rule in
Search and Seizure Cases, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 1365, 1388-89 (1983).
3S. Alison L. Patton, Note, The Endless Cycle of Abuse: Why 42 U.S.C. 5 1983 Is Ineffective in
Deterring Police Brutality, 44 HASTINGS L.J. 753, 753-54 (1993).
36. Jack M. Beermann, The Unhappy History of Civil Rights Legislation, Fifty Years Later, 34
CONN. L. REV. 981, lOlO (2002). Punitive damages are rarely awarded. See Jack M.
Beermann, A Critical Approach to Section 1983 with Special Attention to Sources of Law, 42
STAN. L. REV. 51,78 (1989).
37. Stewart, supra note 34, at 1386-87; Patton, supra note 35, at 754.
38. See Patton, supra note 35, at 754 (emphasizing that plaintiffs rarely win in 5 1983 actions
without corroborating evidence); Gina Barton, Man in Police Case Arrested in Drug Charge,
MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, Apr. 25, 2007, at 3B (describing how a citizen's recording led to the
conviction of a police officer).
39. See Commonwealth v. Hyde, 750 N.E.2d 963, 977 (Mass. 2001) (Marshall, C.J., dissenting)
(referring to the media's "constitutional role of watchdog"); NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL OF
THE NAT'L ACADS., supra note 34, at 280 (explaining that police departments are forced to
respond to significant media attention).
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policing" necessary to democratically legitimize police officers' actions.4"
Citizen recording is the ideal form of citizen review of police actions, because it
puts the power of oversight in the hands of all individuals, not just community
activists.
III. DEFINING THE STATUTORY EXEMPTION
In order to provide a crucial check against police abuses of power, states
that currently prohibit citizen recording of police should amend their laws.
However, these states should account for countervailing factors. First, while
police officers in the line of duty may be entitled to less privacy than private
citizens, 41 police officers are still citizens themselves and entitled to some
privacy. Therefore, these states should explicitly permit citizens to record police
communications other than those uttered with the reasonable expectation that
they would not be recorded.42
In other contexts, this type of "reasonable expectation of privacy" approach
has balanced law enforcement needs, police privacy, and citizen privacy.
Treating the "reasonableness" of the expectation of privacy as a normative
question, courts recognize that police officers must expect less privacy than
private citizens, both because of the public interest in monitoring police for
abuses of power, and because police communications in the line of duty are
generally less intimate in nature than private citizens' communications.4"
Treating the "reasonableness" as a descriptive question of whether one should
predict his privacy will be violated, courts have implied that police officers
cannot reasonably expect not to be recorded when they converse despite their
awareness that private citizens can perceive them,' or speak in a citizen's
40. See Erik Luna, Transparent Policing, 85 IOWA L. REv. 1107 (2000).
41. See supra notes 20-23 and accompanying text.
42. Florida and New Jersey adopt this approach for all communications, no matter who utters
them, FLA. STAT. ANN. § 934.02(2) (West 2OOl); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:1 56A-2 to -3 (West
1985), but Massachusetts and similar states should not unnecessarily limit protection for
citizen communications.
43. See Biehunik v. Felicetta, 441 F.2d 228, 231 (2d Cir. 1971); Mason v. Stock, 869 F. Supp. 828,
833 (D. Kan. 1994); Guiney v. Police Comm'r, 582 N.E.2d 523, 528 (Mass. 1991).
44. See, e.g., Migut v. Flynn, 131 F. App'x 262, 266 (1ith Cir. 2005) (conversations with citizens);
Johnson v. Hawe, 388 F. 3d 676, 685 (9th Cir. 2004) (communications over a police radio
that commonly could be overheard by private citizens); People v. Beardsley, 503 N.E.2d 346,
351 (Ill. 1986) (conversations within hearing of citizens).
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
private space.41 At the same time, police officers may reasonably retain an
expectation of privacy with respect to their own private spaces. 46 Hence, under
this approach, police officers could exercise some control to protect sensitive
investigative or personal information against citizen recording by ensuring that
they communicate about such information only in their own private spaces, or
at least out of citizens' apparent earshot. But citizens would still be permitted
to record officers in public spaces, the citizens' own private spaces, or other
environments in which police privacy is least implicated and citizen privacy and
risks of police abuse are most implicated.
Second, concerns regarding police safety may justify an additional
stipulation regarding citizen recording. Technology allows recording through
passive devices carried on one's person or left in her car or home; there is no
reason to permit more physically intrusive means, such as resisting arrest in
order to record, or putting a recording device in direct physical contact with an
officer. Permitting such physically intrusive forms of recording could drive up
the cost of law enforcement and the difficulty of recruiting police officers,47 as
well as invade officers' valuable privacy interests in bodily integrity. As a result,
states should only excuse citizens who record police officers from liability
under their recording laws, and should not excuse them from liability under
separate laws that prohibit resisting arrest or assaulting a police officer.
While a number of state recording laws already might be construed to
exempt some forms of citizen recording of police, the existing approaches fail
to balance the relevant factors as effectively as the approach proposed in this
Comment. Some approaches over-exempt citizen recording of private citizens.
For example, states with one-party consent rules permit private citizens to
record conversations even without the other parties' consent, which protects
individual privacy less than the Massachusetts law. Similarly, states that
45- See Hornberger v. Am. Broadcasting Cos., 799 A.2d 566 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2002)
(finding that police could not reasonably expect privacy for their conversations inside a
citizen's car in his absence).
46. For example, courts have recognized that police officers have a reasonable expectation of
privacy in at least some areas of their workplace. See, e.g., United States v. Speights, 557 F.2d
362, 363 (3 d Cir. 1977).
47. See Brandon Payne, Estimating the Risk Premium of Law Enforcement Officers (Nov. 27,
2002) (unpublished manuscript), http://www.ecu.edu/ecoVecer/payne.pdf. Unlike risks to
physical safety, emotional discomfort about being recorded seems unlikely to significantly
discourage potential law enforcement officers. See Eddie Jimenez, Watching Cops May Help
Clarify Situations, FRESNO BEE, Mar. 17, 2006, at Bi (reporting a local police chief's comment
that he "isn't opposed to [citizens] filming his officers in action so long as [they] keep[] a
reasonable distance").
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protect citizen communications only if they are deemed "private"8 or
"confidential," 49 or if they are uttered in a "private place"'  or with the
reasonable expectation that they would not be recorded,"' fail to protect many
communications that citizens would subjectively want to remain private. That
approach is inappropriate for states like Massachusetts that wish to protect a
broader swath of citizen communications from nonconsensual recording.
Additionally, many states fail to exempt the most valuable types of citizen
recording. For example, states that require consent from at least one party to
the communication may fail to exempt citizen recording of police
communications in the citizen's private spaces if the citizen is absent. s2 Since
officers seem more likely to disrespect a citizen's spaces and belongings when
the citizen is absent, citizen recording is particularly valuable under such
circumstances. Additionally, those states that specifically protect
communications uttered in "private place[s] " 3  might protect police
communications uttered within a citizen's private home or car during an illegal
search. These states, therefore, ironically protect police communications in the
places where they should be least protected.
Similarly, an exemption that allows a citizen to record without all parties'
consent only if he reasonably suspects that his recording will capture evidence
of another party's imminent criminal offense against him5 4 is too narrow.
Citizens generally will not have reasonable suspicion in advance that officers
will commit a criminal offense against them, as most police-citizen interactions
do not result in illegal police activities. By the time a citizen reasonably suspects
that the officer is likely to commit an offense against her, it will usually be too
late to begin recording.
48. E.g., WASH. REv. CODE ANN. §9.73.030(1) (West 2003).
49. E.g., CAL. PENAL CODE 5 632(a) (West 1999).
5o. E.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-4001(a) (1995).
S. E.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 934.02(2) (West 2001); N.J. STAT. § 2A:1 56A-2(b) (West 1985).
52. See Hornberger v. Am. Broadcasting Cos., 799 A.2d 566 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2002)
(suggesting that the New Jersey recording law would prohibit citizen recording of police
within the citizen's own car but for the law's additional stipulation that it protects only
communications uttered with the justifiable expectation that they would not be recorded).
53. E.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-4001(a) (1995).
54. See 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/14 - 3 0) (West 2003).
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CONCLUSION
The facts of Jean v. Massachusetts State Police strongly call into question the
wisdom of the Massachusetts recording law. Jean demonstrated that the law is
strict enough to prohibit even citizen recording that captures illegal police
behavior within the citizen's own home. Given the need for strong checks on
police abuses of power to protect citizen privacy and the insufficiency of
existing checks, states like Massachusetts should amend their recording laws to
exempt citizen tape recording of police so long as it is not achieved by
physically intrusive means and does not infringe upon police officers'
reasonable expectation that they would not be recorded.
DINA MISHRA
